Africa accounts for more than a quarter of United Nations member states and features in a large share of Security Council resolutions, yet it holds no permanent seat on the body that can authorise sanctions or the use of force. The African Union has formally demanded at least two permanent seats with the same powers as the existing five, including the veto for as long as that instrument remains. Decades of speeches and negotiating rounds have not produced the Charter amendment required to make it happen. The obstacles are structural, political and, to a degree, internal to the continent itself.
The Formal Barrier: Changing the Charter
The composition of the Security Council is written into the United Nations Charter. Any change to permanent membership requires an amendment under Article 108. That means approval by two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the member states, including every one of the five permanent members. In practice this gives China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States an individual veto over reform. No amount of General Assembly majorities can override a single permanent member’s refusal to ratify.
This design was intentional in 1945. It protected the wartime powers from being outvoted on the rules that govern the use of force. It also makes genuine redistribution of permanent seats extraordinarily difficult.
Divergent Positions Among the Permanent Five
The five permanent members do not speak with one voice on African representation.
France has been the most explicit supporter of permanent African seats that include veto rights. The United States has indicated openness to two permanent African seats but has resisted extending the veto to any new permanent members, arguing that a larger group of veto-holders would make the Council even less able to act. Russia consistently emphasises preservation of the existing veto as a guarantee of great-power balance and has cautioned against expanding the Council to a size that, in its view, would reduce efficiency. China supports greater African representation in principle while insisting that any reform must proceed by consensus among the permanent members and the wider membership.
These differences mean that even when leaders publicly acknowledge the injustice of Africa’s exclusion, the detailed text of an amendment remains elusive. A seat without the veto is unacceptable to the African Union because it would create a formal second class of permanent membership. Full veto rights for new members are unacceptable to at least some of the current permanent members.
Africa’s Own Position and the Question of Who Sits
The continental position is set out in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. It calls for no fewer than two permanent seats and additional non-permanent seats. Critically, the African Union states that the seats belong to Africa as a whole, not to any particular capital. The Union would decide the occupying countries.
In practice this formula has both strengths and complications. It maintains continental unity and prevents early fragmentation into rival national campaigns. At the same time it leaves open the practical question of which states would actually occupy the seats. Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and others are frequently discussed as candidates. Regional rivalries and differing views on criteria (size, economic weight, diplomatic capacity, contribution to peacekeeping) make a final internal selection politically sensitive. Without a named slate, external negotiators can more easily treat the demand as abstract rather than as a concrete proposal ready for drafting.
Competing Reform Agendas
Africa is not the only region seeking change. The G4 grouping (Germany, Japan, India and Brazil) has long pressed for permanent seats of its own. Other coalitions prefer expansion only of the elected membership or different formulas for limiting the veto. These overlapping and sometimes conflicting claims multiply the number of issues that must be resolved simultaneously: overall size of the Council, categories of membership, regional distribution, working methods and the future of the veto. The more issues that are linked, the harder it becomes to assemble a package that satisfies two-thirds of the membership and all five permanent members.
Intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform have continued for years without producing a negotiated text that commands the necessary support. Procedural debates about whether negotiations should move to text-based drafting have themselves become points of contention.
Why the Status Quo Persists
The combination of a high legal threshold, divergent permanent-member interests, an unresolved African selection mechanism and competing global claims creates a durable equilibrium. Permanent members have limited incentive to dilute their own privileges. African states have limited ability to force the issue without a unified, detailed proposal that can attract wider support. Other aspirants have their own red lines. The result is repeated acknowledgement of the problem at successive General Assembly sessions and little movement on the Charter itself.
Africa’s case rests on clear demographic, political and workload realities. The continent is routinely the subject of a large share of Council decisions yet has no permanent voice in the room where those decisions are taken. Closing that gap requires more than moral argument. It requires a negotiated package that the permanent members are prepared to ratify and that African states can sustain among themselves. Until those conditions align, the demand for permanent African seats will continue to be voiced and continue to remain unmet.
What do you see as the single biggest obstacle: the veto issue, the Charter amendment rule, divisions among the permanent five, or the question of which African countries would take the seats? Share your assessment.
Frequently Asked Questions
What exactly does Africa demand?
At least two permanent seats with the same rights as the current permanent members, including the veto for as long as the veto exists, plus additional non-permanent seats. The seats are described as belonging to the continent rather than to named countries.
Why can the permanent five block reform?
Any Charter amendment needs ratification by all five permanent members. One refusal is enough to stop the change.
Do any permanent members support African seats?
France has been the clearest supporter of seats that include veto rights. The United States has indicated support for seats but not for extending the veto. Russia and China attach conditions related to balance and consensus.
Has the Security Council ever been expanded before?
Yes. It grew from 11 to 15 members in the mid-1960s through the addition of elected seats. Permanent membership has remained unchanged since 1945.
Why does the African Union insist on the veto?
It argues that permanent membership without the veto would create a formal hierarchy among permanent members and would not correct the underlying inequality.
Is there progress at the current General Assembly?
Leaders continue to raise the issue and the injustice is widely acknowledged. Movement from principle to a ratifiable amendment text has not yet occurred.
Reference links:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/26/unga81-why-has-africas-security-council-reform-push-remained-unresolved
https://english.realtribune.ru/three-obstacles-on-africas-path-to-the-un-security-council
https://diplomaticwatch.com/why-is-africa-still-not-on-the-un-security-council-the-demand-for-a-permanent-seat/
https://radarafrica.com/africa/africa-un-security-council-reform/
https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/politics/security-council-reform-africas-demands-and-why-the-veto-divides-the-powers/20260922111609229461.html
https://www.trtafrika.com/english/article/bb511a12373c
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